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POVZETEK 
Prispevek obravnava vrsto vsebin s področja nove-
jših usmeritev teorije glasbe. K njim sodi nasproto-
vanje 'analizi' ali 'strukturnemu poslušanju' kot 
(domneven) prispevek Nove muzikologije v 
diskurz mainstream muzikologije, katere namen naj 
bi bil nenehno obnavljanje kanona priznanih 
'mojstrovin' in vrsta elitističnih vrednostnih sodb, ki 
so običajno naslovljene na taka dela. K temu sodi 
ideja - izpeljana po Paulu de Manu in pred-
stavnikih literarne dekonstrukcije -, da bi mogli 
imeti pojmi, kot so 'organska forma', strukturna 
enovitost, tematska povezanost, celovit tonalitetni 
ali harmonski razvoj itn. in so razumljeni kot rezul-
tat določene 'estetske ideologije' za sumljive, celo 
usodne posledice, če bi jih uporabili na širšem 
polju kulturne politike. Menim, da je to zgrešena ali 
vsaj zelo tendencionzna miselnost, ki sama nedo-
pustno transponira pojme iz enega (literarnoteo-
retskega) področja, kjer tovrstni argumenti imajo 
določeno moč, na drugo (glasbenoteoretsko) 
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ABSTRACT 
This essay raises a number of issues with regard to 
recent developments in music theory. Among them 
is the turn against 'analysis' or 'structural listening' 
on account of their (supposed) investment in a dis-
course of mainstream musicology whose aim is to 
perpetuate the canon of acknowledged 'great 
works' and the kinds of elitist value-judgement that 
are conventionally applied to such works. Along 
with this goes the idea - derived from Paul de Man 
and exponents of literary deconstruction - that 
notions such as those of 'organic form', structural 
unity, thematic integration, long-range tona! or har-
monic development, etc„ are products of a certain 
'aesthetic ideology' with dubious, even sinister, 
implications when transposed to the wider realm of 
cultural politics. I maintain that this is a false, or at 
any rate a highly tendentious line of thought which 
itself involves the illicit transposition from one 
domain (that of literary criticism) where such argu-
ments have a certain force to another (that of music 
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področje, kjer preprosto ne vzdržijo kritike drugače 
kot z močno in nezadovoljivo raztegljivostjo po 
načelu analogije. Tak6 je zoperstavljanje naivnemu 
organicističnemu hranju poetične metafore pri de 
Manu, ki domneva neposredno kontinuiteto (celo 
identičnost) med umom in naravo, subjektom in 
objektom, ali jezikom in pojavno intuicijo, pri 
prenosu na področje naše čutne glasbene izkušnje, 
ki je tudi konceptualno podprta, izrazito 
neustrezno. 
Nakazana vprašanja skušam podajati skozi branje 
različnih teoretikov z obeh strani debate, vključno 
z Adornom, čigar poudarjanje kreposti 'strukturne-
ga poslušanja' kot sredstva upora proti rutinskim, v 
navado otrdelim ali ideološko pogojenim načinom 
odzivanja ponuja morda najbolj mogočen ugovor 
novejšim nasprotovanju analizi v vseh njenih 
oblikah. Nadalje tudi dodajam, da so bile te oblike 
analize veliko bolj raznolike - in pogosto manj 
predane organicistični veri - kot jih skušajo pred-
staviti njihovi obrekovalci, ki nagibajo k enačenju 
'analize' z analitično metodo Heinricha Schenkerja 
in njenim v temelju konservativnim, dogmatskim in 
ideološko obremenjenim pristopom. V podporo 
svojemu protiargumentu se sklicujem na različne 
smernice kognitivne znanosti in psihologije per-
cepcije skupaj z nedavno debato med filozofoma 
Petrom Kivyjem in Jerroldom Levinsonom, ki zade-
va močno kontroverzno tezo slednjega, namreč da 
je razumevanje glasbe zamejeno na časovno zelo 
kratke odlomke (spominskega in anticipatoričnega) 
dojemanja. Izvajanje sklenem z mislijo, da je 
mogoče naše presojanje glasbe krepko poglobiti in 
obogatiti z različnimi vrstami trajnostnega ali dol-
gosežnega strukturnega dojemanja glasbenega 
toka, kot ga skuša razkriti analiza, in da je katera 
koli teorija, ki to izključuje - ali znižuje na golo 
'estetsko ideologijo' -, ipso facto na napačni poti. 
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theoty) where they simply don't apply unless by a 
great and implausible stretch of analogy. Thus de 
Man' s case against na!vely organi cist readings of 
poetic metaphor which assume a direct continuity 
Ceven identity) between mind and nature, subject 
and object, or language and phenomenal intuition 
must appear distinctly off-the-point when applied 
to our sensuous but also conceptually-informed 
experience of music. 
My essay pursues these questions via a reading of 
various theorists on both sides of the debate, 
including Adorno, whose emphasis on the virtues 
of 'structural listening' as a means of resistance to 
routine, habitual, or ideologically conditioned 
modes of response offers perhaps the most power-
ful rejoinder to this current revolt against analysis in 
all its forms. I go on to remark that those forms 
have been far more diverse - and often less com-
mitted to a hard-line organicist creed - than their 
detractors like to make out, tending as they do to 
equate 'analysis' with Heinrich Schenker's deeply 
conservative, dogmatic, and ideologically-loaded 
approach. In support of my counter-argument I 
draw on various developments in cognitive science 
and the psychology of perception, along with a 
recent debate between the philosophers Peter Kivy 
and J errold Levinson concerning the latter' s highly 
controversial claim that musical understanding is 
limited to very short stretches of temporal (retentive 
and anticipatory) grasp. I conclude that our appre-
ciation of music can be greatly deepened and 
enriched by the kinds of sustained or long-range 
structural comprehension that analysis seeks to 
provide, and that any theory which rules this out -
or puts it down to mere 'aesthetic ideology' - is 
ipso facto on the wrong track. 
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1 
It is a long tirne - getting on for a century - since literary critics first became involved in 
earnest (often heated) debate about the relative merits of 'appreciative' and 'analytic' criticism. 
In fact one can date thc most significant outbreak to the period just following the 1930 publi-
cation of William Empson's Seven Types oj Amhiguity, a text that is nowadays perhaps more 
talked about than actually read but which remains (in my judgement) altogether unsurpassed 
for sheer brilliance, acuity, analytic insight, and - be it said - occasional flights of soaring free-
associative fancy (Empson 1930). No work since then has come anywhere close to Seven Types 
for the extent of its influence (especially on the US New Criticism) and the way that it opened 
up new possibilities of detailecl textual exegesis combined with the strongly speculative bent 
of a first-rate analytical intelligence. Incleed it is fair to say that this transformative impact was 
as much upon the poems or passages that Empson singled out for scrutiny as upon those 
receptive - and to that extent 'appreciative' - readers for whom poetry would never be quite 
the same again. Nevertheless the book attracted, and continues to attract, a good deal of hos-
tile commentary from two main quarters. On the one hand are scholar-critics, like Rosamond 
Tuve, who have attacked Empson for his flagrant 'misreaclings', most often brought about -
they claim - through his blithely anachronistic approach or cavalier clisregard for the standards 
of interpretative truth imposed by a due respect for the constraints of philological research, 
authorial intent, and period-based generic convention. (See for instance Tuve 1952.) On the 
other - more relevant in the present context - is the charge brought against him by those who 
maintain that our experience of poetry is first and foremost a matter of 'appreciation', that isto 
say, an intuitive mode of response that cannot - or should not be subject to any such plea-
sure-destroying excesses of analytic rigour. 
This objection was voiced by John Sparrow in an article, published in the journal Oxford 
Outlook, to which Empson replied with a vigorous defence of his own, typically 'Cambridge' 
outlook of sturdy scientific rationalism versus Sparrow's typically 'Oxford' offence at the idea 
of having his fine-tuned aesthetic responses so ruclely laicl open to inspection (Empson 1987: 
193-202; also Sparrow 1930: 598;:i607). In other words, there was no real clanger that (in 
Empson's phrase) by 'pruning down too far toward the emotional roots' the critic might there-
by destroy the delicate flower. Any good poem, i.e„ one that meritecl such close analytical 
attention woulcl surely stand to gain through this process of helping the reader to appreciate 
at a more conscious or reflective leve! what had hitherto been largely a matter of inchoate, ill-
defined emotive response. And again, if the poem - or the reader's enjoyment - was spoiled 
by the analyst's approach then most likely that enjoyment was misplaced, whether because the 
poem didn't deserve it or because the reader was responding in some wrong or inappropriate 
(e.g„ emotionally self-indulgent) way. Thus, for Empson, the chief virtue of analytic criticism 
was in drawing conscious attention to a range of otherwise unnoticed (or subliminal) nuances 
and depths of meaning, and thereby offering the reader a firmer, more conficlent basis for arriv-
ing at judgements of value. At the same tirne it could happily avoid the kind of vague, unsup-
portecl, or downright dogmatic evaluative talk that all too often resulted when critics like 
Sparrow fell back on the appeal to unaided intuition as the sole arbiter of aesthetic or literary 
worth. That is to say, any judgement could be taken as implicit in the fact that the poem or 
passage concerned had not only been singled out for close attention but shown itself respon-
sive to an analytic treatment whose success - in so far as it achieved its aims - was sufficient 
guarantee of such worth. At this stage opponents are likely to object that the whole process 
has become purely circular, since 'good' poetry is now definecl as just the sort that lends itself 
best to the analyst's foregone methods and predilections, while these are in turn borne out by 
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(what else?) their working so well with the poetry in question. To which Empson's response, 
quite simply, is that the mind takes pleasure in achieving a better, more conscious grasp of its 
own operations and hence that any doctrine - like that of his opponents - which prevents it 
from so doing is one with harmful consequences not only for our appreciation of poetry but 
also, by extension, for the conduct of our intellectual, moral, and everyday social lives.1 
So much for the back-and-forth of this debate as it emerged in response to Empson's Seven 
Types and has continued to rumble on since then, as for instance in the later round of 'theory-
wars' provoked by deconstruction, post-structuralism, and other such dubious continental 
imports as viewed by the (mainly Anglophone) upholders of intuitive or common-sense wis-
dom. However it would over-simplify the issue to state it in quite these terms since, as anyone 
will know who has followed developments in French critical thought over the past three 
decades, things have moved on apace since the heyday of structuralism in its 'classic', i.e„ 
intensely theoretical and (at least by its then-current lights) methodologically rigorous phase. 
The challenge to that erstwhile confident self-image came from various quarters, among them 
Derrida's deconstructive reading of Saussurean structural linguistics and Levi-Strauss's structur-
al anthropology. (See Derrida 1976; and Derrida 1978: 278-93.) It also took a lead from Roland 
Barthes' reflections in The Pleasure ofthe Text and elsewhere - on that whole missing dimen-
sion of affective and erotic experience (plaisir and jouissance) which could not but elude the 
grim paternal law of a full-fledged structuralist approach, as adopted in some of his own ear-
lier writings (Barthes 1976). Stili it is hard to avoid the impression that Barthes' turn 'against 
theory' is one that not only draws intellectual sustenance from ali those past encounters (with 
Saussure, Lacan, and Althusser among others) but also leaves room for a great deal of ve1y sub-
tle between-the-lines theoretical and speculative thought. (For further striking examples see 
Barthes 1975; Barthes1977 and Barthes 1977a.) In most respects no two critics could be more 
different than Empson and Barthes, the one a commonsensical, distinctly 'British' kind of ratio-
nalist with strong empiricist leanings who tended to excoriate literary theory (especially in its 
French manifestations) as so much intellectual hot air, the other (so to speak) a theorist mal-
gre lui even his moments of intimate reflection on the erotics of reader-response. 2 All the same 
they have at least this much in common: that they conceive the relationship between theo1y, 
analysis, and pleasure (or appreciation) as one that goes wrong - gives rise to much sterile 
debate - as soon as those activities are thought of as in any way separable one from another. 
2 
My main interest here - and my pretext for this detour via Empson and Barthes - is the 
recent emergence of similar debates with regard to the merits of musical analysis as a means 
of enhancing or (as some would have it) of obstructing our straightforward, intuitive grasp of 
what music has to offer by way of pleasurable experience.3 This analogy is itself rather less 
than straightforward for various historical, cultural, and discipline-specific reasons. One is the 
fact that music analysis was pretty well established asa modus operandi from the mid-19th cen-
tury on, albeit in forms that would scarcely pass muster by present-day academic standards. 
appreciation of music - or adequate account of musical meaning and value - would need to 
respect its 'absolute' status and would hence do well to resist or discount any notion of pro-
grammatic content (Hanslick 1986). Such was the basic philosophical premise of what there For 
it was then that the idea emerged, most forcefully in Hanslick's writings, that any genuine 
1 See various of the artides and reviews collected in Argufying 1987 for further arguments to this effect. 
2 See Argufying 1987 for some of Empson's repeated fallings-out with 'theoiy' in its various forms. 
3 See for instance Baker I Beach I Bernard 1977; Bergeron / Bohlman 1992; Cook / Everist 1999; Kramer 1995); Lochhead / Auner 2002; 
Solie 1993. 
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after became a veritable item of faith for critics who professed to be concerned with the musi-
cal work 'itself, rather than with various (no doubt interesting but strictly extrinsic) aspects of 
its cultural background, psychological genesis, reception-histo1y, and so folth. 
Thus the trend toward ever more refined and sophisticated methods of formal-structural 
analysis is one that took hold very largely through the growth of academic musicology and its 
attendant division of intellectual labour between, on the one hand, positivistically-inclined 
music historians or sociologists and, on the other, theorist-critics with a strong autonomist bias.4 
Its benchmark expression - for proponents and antagonists alike - was Schenker's ultra-for-
malist insistence on tracing every detail of a work's surface structure to some underlying gen-
erative theme or motif which then served as justification for the claim of structural coherence 
or 'organic' form. 5 Indeed this approach went so far as to assert that the ultimate aim of analy-
sis was to derive the entire composition from the tonic triad (or root chord) in relation to which 
it could then be seen as a massive yet always homebound excursion through various themat-
ic transformations, tona! departures, or long-drawn cadential and other such suspensive 
devices. To be sure this invites a number of objections, among them the familiar circularity-
charge (to put it crudely: that analyst and work are engaged in a process of mutual reputation-
boosting) and the claim that such methods, Schenker's in particular, are reductionist to the 
point where all music is treated - absurdly - as a mere detour en route to restoring that pri-
mordial 'chord of nature'.6 Fu!thermore, suspicions have·Iately been raised that the origins of 
this approach were deeply bound up with a form of 'aesthetic ideology' which deployed 
metaphors of organic growth and development in the service of a cultural-nationalist creed with 
distinctly hegemonk, highly conservative and (some would say) proto-fascist inclinations.7 
After all, Schenker took it as self-evident - a truth infallibly borne out by analysis - that the 
greatest works were those belonging to the mainstream Austro-German line of descent from 
Bach, through Haydn, Mozalt and Beethoven, to Schubert and Brahms. This status had to do 
not only with their superior degree of thematic complexity and forma! integration but also with 
their standing in just that kind of privileged lineal relationship, one that effectively transferred 
those values from the individual work - organically conceived - to a version of musical histo-
ry likewise premised on organicist (i.e., strongly teleological) notions of predestined develop-
ment and growth. 
Whence, so the charge-sheet continues, Schenker's attitude of undisguised contempt for 
any. music - including, notoriously, that of Debussy - whose sensuous appeal, thematic elu-
siveness, or lack of 'structure' in the operative (Schenker-approved) sense rendered them resis-
tant or opaque to analysis and thus placed them firmly beyond the canonical pale. Moreover, 
in hindsight, that attitude takes on a whole range of disturbing, even sinister oveltones to the 
extent that it foreshadows those kinds of 'national aestheticism' - exemplified above all in the 
Wagner-cult and associated forms of Nazi cultural propaganda - which likewise entailed a 
demotion or suppression of other, so-called 'decadent' or 'degenerate' alt (Lacoue-Labalthe / 
Nancy 1988). In short, there is a dangerous pseudo-logic that can easily lead from claims con-
ceming the structural integrity or 'organic' character of certain works, via claims with regard to 
their intrinsic value thus defined and analytically revealed, to claims that such value is the sole 
prerogative of just those cultures - or just that singular, rightfully predominant culture - which 
brought them to bi11h. That Schenker is well known to have espoused political views very 
much in keeping with such musico-aesthetic values and predilections is yet further grist to the 
4 See Kerman 1980; Keiman 1983; Kerman 1985; also Bumham 1996; Solie 1980. 
5 See Schenker1973; Schenker 1979; also Beach 1983; Blasius 1996; Forte / Gilbert 1982); Narmour 1977; Siegel 1990; Treitler 1989; Yeston 
1977. 
6 See various entries under Notes 3, 4 and S, above. 
7 See far instance Goehr 1992; Korsyn 1993; Solie 1993; also - in a closely related vein - Man 1996; Lacoue-Labanhe ! Nancy 1988. 
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deconstructive mil! of those present-day theorists - exponents of the 'New Musicology' - who 
have taken to denouncing the whole enterprise of 'analysis' as merely an expression of deep-
laid ideological bias concealed behind a fake appearance of objectivity and rigour. (Notes 3 
and 4.) Along with this, very often, goes a protest in the name of musical pleasure, enjoyment, 
or appreciation as against the kind of 'structural listening' enjoined by critics who assume - in 
typically 'analytic' style - that any hearing of a work which fails to perceive its long-term pat-
terns of thematic transformation, motivic development, tona! progression, and so forth, is a 
hearing that manifestly fails to grasp its trne significance and value.8 
Such claims are by no means confined to analysts of a broadly orthodox, that is to say, for 
the most part academically-based and - by their own account - politically neutral persuasion. 
Indeed, the case for 'structural listening' is one that is put with great emphasis by Adorno since 
he considers it the only means by which music can effectively challenge - or be heard and 
understood to challenge - the kinds of uncritical, facile, or stereotyped response that otherwise 
typify every aspect of our social and cultural lives under the conditions of late commodity cap-
italism. (See especially Adorno 1973, 1982, 1997, 1998.) Thus, for him, it stands opposed to 
those forms of mass-media entertainment (such as music that lends itself readily to large-scale 
popular consumption) whose relentless promotion by the 'culture industry' is among the most 
effective agencies of social control, working as it does to repress or destroy any last remnant 
of the critical-emancipatory impulse (Adorno 1991). Bence Adorno's stark diagnosis of the 
trend toward 'regressive listening' which fails (or refuses) to engage with the long-term struc-
tural elements of musical fonn and contents itself solely with the kinds of enjoyment to be had 
from the standard fare of 'popular classics', or from favourite chunks of those works wrenched 
out of context so as to demand least effort of musical comprehension. 
For many readers this just goes to show that Adorno, whatever his supposedly 'radical' (i.e„ 
Marxist-influenced) ideas, was in fact an upholder of the cultural status quo and a defender of 
elitist values which were none the less so for his presenting them in the guise of a critical the-
ory that proclaimed its opposition to every form of ideological conditioning. (See Briel / Kramer 
2001; Cook D. 1996); Gibson / Rubin 2002; Paddison 1996.) As evidence of this they cite 
(among other things) his constant appeal to the canonical maste1works of Western musical tra-
dition, his indiscriminate lumping-together of 'authentic' jazz with its tin-pan-alley derivatives, 
and (above all) his contempt for any music that didn't measure up to those classically-derived 
standards of forma! integrity and good taste. The latter is a phrase that would scarcely have 
entered Adorno's critical lexicon but one - so his adversaries argue - that none the less cap-
tures the ethos and the tone of his writing once shorn of its pseudo-radical posturing. Thus 
Adorno's uneasy (not to say perverse) combination of an intensely formalist analytic approach 
with a critical agenda premised on emancipatory social and ethical values tends always to lean 
in the former direction, that is, toward an idea of 'structural listening' which effectively dis-
qualifies any response that falls short of its own exacting criteria. What this amounts to is a fur-
ther propping-up of 'the canon' and its hegemonk status, along with those increasingly refined 
analytical methods (albeit here bearing a Marxist inflection) which have served to maintain that 
status through various well-practised techniques of ideological co-option. 
Such is at any rate the charge levelled against Adorno by a range of hostile commentators, 
from defenders of 'popular' music in its various forms, genres, or styles to critics who reject 
what they see as his Kantian (again strictly formalist) bias against any kind of aesthetic 'appre-
ciation' that errs on the side of sensuous pleasure or downright hedonist indulgence. Amongst 
the New Musicologists one who has argued very forcefully to this effect is Rose Rosengard 
8 Por a range of views on musical analysis, its scope and limits, see Bent ! Drabkin 1987; Cook 1989; Cook 1993; Cook 1996; Dempster I 
Brown 1990; Dunsby / Whittall 1988; Pople 1994. 
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Subotnik in her book Deconstructive Variations (Subotnik 1996). Here she puts the case that 
any such emphasis on the virtues of 'structural listening' - whether by mainstream music ana-
lysts or by those, like Adorno, who claim to deploy it in the service of socio-cultural critique -
should be seen as just another standard device for shoring up those ideological values invested 
in the canon of received 'great' works. Subotnik finds nothing but high-brow cultural prejudice 
linked to professional self-interest in the notion that those works are intrinsically such as to 
demand an effort of sustained analytical attention, and that this provides not only a measure of 
their true greatness but a touchstone of musical perceptiveness and intelligence on the listener's 
part. Bence Adorno's attitude of sovereign contempt for those other, less elevated modes of 
response - ruthlessly exploited by the 'culture-indust1y' - which, so far from requiring a capac-
ity for long-term structural grasp, encourage the listener to attend spasmodically, to pick out 
favourite passages for repeated hearing, and completely to ignore any aspects of musical form 
beyond the most basic, easily assimilated melodies and harmonic progressions. To his way of 
thinking, this marked the prevalence of a regressive, even infantile fixation on the kinds of pure-
ly sensuous pleasure - or desire for immediate gratification - that went along with other signs 
of a widespread malaise in the body politic, such as the demise of autonomous critical reflec-
tion among those who took their beliefs and values ready-made from mass meclia sources. Thus 
the stultification of collective intelligence went on apace, aided in no small part by the endless 
recycling of cliched, stereotyped modes of listener-response whose effect - as with jazz, on 
Adorno's notoriously negative view of it - was to create an illusion of spontaneity which in fact 
worked to conceal its thoroughly bana! and commoclified character (Adorno 1991). 
In an earlier book, Developing Variations, Subotnik had drawn quite extensively on 
Adorno's musical and sociological analyses, not least in making her case for a feminist and 
class-based critique of the dominant paracligms in academic musicology (Subotnik 1991). With 
the sequel, as I have said, she pretty much disowns this allegiance and comes out very strong-
ly against his idea that 'structural listening' to works that invite or reward such attention is the 
sine qua non for any critical practice that would keep faith with music's now much diminished 
and yet - as Adorno strives to maintain - stil! latent emancipat01y potential or occluded truth-
content (Adorno 1991a; Adorno 199lb; Adorno 1998a). On the contrary, she argues: this 
Adornian perspective is just another chapter in the long history of high-toned formalist and 
philosophic put-downs suffered by popular culture at the hands of those who would denigrate 
its pleasures as nothing more than frivolous distractions or ways of remaining blissfully well 
deceived. Thus Subotnik sees nothing wrong - nothing at all 'unmusical' in the kinds of unfo-
cused, intermittent, easily side-tracked, half-conscious, or free-associative listening that Adorno 
finds grimly symptomatic of our twilight cultural state. Still less does she go along with his dis-
tinctly Kantian mistrust of any pleasure in modes of aesthetic experience - such as the enjoy-
ment of music at a sensuous leve! - that cannot be subject to forma! analysis, or to treatment 
in conceptual (philosophic) terms. 
To be sure, a central theme and motivating impulse in much of Adorno's work is the need 
to resist that totalising (potentially totalitarian) drive toward absolute conceptual mastery that 
tencls always to repress or ignore the stubborn particularities of lived experience (Adorno 1997; 
Adorno 1974). Yet it is often hard to escape the impression that Adorno's own dialectical drive 
- albeit in the name of a 'negative dialectics' that strives to resist such closure - is itself so 
strong and conceptually hard-driven as to place that aim in some doubt. Thus his critics have 
a point when they remark on this tension in Aclorno's thought between an overt dedication to 
saving the particular from the ravages of abstract generality and an approach that risks doing 
precisely the opposite through its relentless pursuit of dialectical arguments whose result - very 
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often - isto force a procrustean either/or logic onto musical works and musico-historical devel-
opments. Such is, for instance, the doctrinaire juxtaposition of Schoenberg versus Stravinsky in 
Philosophy oj New Music and the constant presumption in Adorno's writing that any musical 
'appreciation' meriting the name must go by way of so intensive an analytical engagement as 
to place it quite beyond reach of any but the most refined and highly-trained musical intellects. 
So to this extent at least there is a certain justice in the charge often levelled against Adorno of 
his having drastically devalued the role of pleasure (or sensuous fulfilment) in our experience 
of music and, by the same token, over-rated the importance of analytic grasp - or 'structural 
listening' - as a measure of what such experience properly involves. 
Ali the same this argument may be thought to have gone too far if it concludes that analy-
sis has no place in our musical responses, or that pleasurable listening has nothing whatever 
to do with the kinds of longer-term structural awareness that analysts are expert in finding out. 
Thus Adorno was right to insist - as against Subotnik and others who attack his 'elitist' 
approach - that there is something intrinsically valuable about the kinds of listening (and the 
kinds of work) that find room for a perception of long-range tona!, thematic, and develop-
mental structure as well as for the more immediate pleasures of short-term sensuous response. 
To adopt such a view is not merely, as some sociologists of culture would have it, an expres-
sion of class-prejudice or gender-bias encoded in a highly technical language (i.e., the dis-
course of present-day, post-Schenkerian music analysis) whose seeming objectivity and effort 
to avoid any taint of programmatic or affective content is precisely the mark of its ideological 
character. (See various entries under Notes 3, 4, 5 and 7; also Bourdieu 1984.) That isto say, 
borrowing a useful distinction from philosophy of science, interests of this sort may well play 
a role in the 'context of discovery' where music critics - and listeners bent upon increasing 
their stock of 'cultural capital' - are no doubt subject to all manner of social, professional, aca-
demic, psycho-biographical, and other such extraneous motivating factors. However they have 
no bearing on issues raised in the 'context of justification' where it is a matter of making good 
one's claims with respect to (say) structures of tona! development or motivic and thematic 
transformation. (See especially Reichenbach 1938.) For those claims are typically advanced with 
respect to certain agreed-upon standards - of evidence, precision, demonstrative warrant, sen-
sitivity to context, and so forth - in consequence of which they can properly be held to stand 
on their merits and transcend any reductive sociological account. 
Of course it will be said by opponents that these are just the sorts of self-confirming, pure-
ly circular and hence empirically vacuous criteria that typify the analytic enterprise, determined 
as it is to keep itself in business by producing ever more elaborate analyses which merely take 
for granted the superiority of music that suits its own preconceived values. Thus the two main 
prongs of this adversary case are, first, that such values apply only to a narrow, canonically 
privileged subset of musical works and practices, and second, that they are not so much 'there' 
to be discovered through objective analysis as projected onto those works through a strong dis-
position in favour of ideas like thematic development, organic form, structural complexity, etc. 
Hence Subotnik's later, more 'radical' position according to which there is something intrinsi-
cally suspect - ideologically compromised - about the whole business of music analysis, even 
where this takes the form (as in Adorno) of a project with overtly critical, progressive, and 
social-emancipatory aims. 
3 
These developments in recent, broadly 'deconstructive' music theory can be traced back to 
a influential 1983 essay by the critic Joseph Kerman, whose work up to then had combined an 
26 
C. NORRIS • IN DEFENCE OF 'STRUCTURAL HEARING': SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE ... 
analytic with a cultural-historical approach and done so without any overt sense of a looming 
crisis in either discipline, or the relationship between them (Kerman 1980). The article ('How 
We Got Into Analysis, and How to Get Out') sought to put an end to this comfortable state of 
affairs by declaring the crisis already upon us and offering a diagnostic account of its symp-
toms and their cultural aetiology. Briefly stated, analysis as practised hitherto by mainstream 
musicologists was a product of that same 'aesthetic ideology' which literary theorists had long 
since recognised as a potent source of illusory notions - such as that of 'organic form' - whose 
extension into the wider (socio-cultural and political) domain was at best an unfortunate cate-
gory-mistake and at worst a highly dangerous conflation of realms. (Notes 3 and 4.) It was just 
this delusion which had given rise to that particular strain of 'aestheticised' politics whose 
expressions ranged from the more overtly nationalist versions of German idealism and roman-
ticism to Wagner's ideal of the Gesamtkunstwerk, or from Schenker's conception of musical 
form as growing out of certain germinal motifs to his likewise deeply organicist view of those 
same values as bearing out his claim for the superior quality of works in the Austro-German 
line of descent. Thus Kerman put the case that musicologists had yet to catch up with certain 
crucial developments in literary theory - chiefly of a French provenance - which had gone far 
toward deconstructing the kinds of ideological baggage that went along with the analytic pro-
gramme, albeit (no doubt) unbeknownst to most of its practitioners. What the discipline need-
ed was a healthy injection of 'theory', this latter equated by Kerman with a willingness to exam-
ine its own deep-laid, even (it might be) discipline-constitutive values, assumptions, and pri-
orities. Only thus - by taking various leaves out of the deconstructionist book - might analy-
sis shed that bad Schenkerian legacy of national-aestheticist thinking and learn to question 
those hegemonk notions Cof form, unity, thematic integration, 'structural listening', and so 
forth) that presently exerted such a harmful grip on its working principles and practices. 
What made the situation worse, according to Kerman, was the way that music analysis of 
this sort went along with an approach to musical histo1y that was likewise in hock to certain 
outworn, nineteenth-century 'positivist' conceptions of scholarly method. Here also, musicol-
ogists proceeded as if their discipline could and should remain entirely untouched by those 
major developments in other fields - hermeneutics, critical historiography, narrative poetics, 
structuralism, post-structuralism, feminism, deconstruction - whose deployment elsewhere had 
exerted such a powerful transformative impact. Once they started taking stock of such devel-
opments, Kerman surmised, they would find themselves impelled not only to re-think the 
methodological foundations of their work but also to raise serious doubts with regard to its ide-
ological complicities, not least as concerned that entente cordiale - rather nicely exemplified, 
one is tempted to remark, in Kerman's own previous work - between music history and music 
analysis as currently practised. (See for instance Kerman 1962, 1967, 1981.) In particular they 
would have to ask whether the very fact of this peaceful coexistence might not indicate a symp-
tomatic failure or refusal to examine that complex, essentially contested, and ideologically 
charged relationship. Even a cursory acquaintance with the writings of a literary theorist like 
Paul de Man would suffice to show that they had come nowhere near thinking it through with 
the requisite degree of self-critical awareness. (See Man 1996; also Man 1983, 1984 and Man 
1986.) And it would then become apparent, so Kerman claimed, that musicology in both 
departments was in urgent need of opening its doors to the kinds of thinking that had brought 
such benefits - as he definitely took them to be - when applied in those other, more advanced 
and speculative regions of debate. 
When Kerman's essay first appeared he could plausibly strike the heroic tone of one cry-
ing in the academic wilderness, or of Milton's archangel Abdiel, 'alone against the forces of 
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night'. Now, twenty years on, his plea for musicologists to broaden their theoretical horizons 
and absorb the lessons of deconstruction and other such cutting-edge developments is apt to 
sound distinctly old-hat or more like a fairly conservative prognosis of developments already 
under way. For it can hardly escape the notice of anyone who browses through the current 
music journals, bibliographies, or publishers' catalogues that musicology has taken the 'decon-
structive turn' with a vengeance, and that 'theory' has triumphed (or at any rate macle territor-
ial inroacls) beyoncl Kerman's wildest dreams. (See Notes 3, 4 and 7.) Incleecl it woulcln't sur-
prise me if he was less than happy about the extent to which - in certain qua1ters at least -
his proposals have been taken on board and the rapidity with which they have become some-
thing very like an orthodox creed. Thus there is now a minor indust1y of 'deconstructive' musi-
cology devoted to dismantling both the discourse of mainstream analysis - especially any talk 
of 'organic form' - ancl, beyoncl that, the habits of structural listening or long-term musical-cog-
nitive uptake which are thought to fall in with just such ideologically complicitous notions. 
Of these debates perhaps the most revealing is that between Jonathan Dunsby and Alan 
Street on the topic of Brahms' late piano Fantasies, Op. 116. In this sequence of pieces - most 
often thought of as loosely related in terms of style, moocl, and general character - Dunsby 
purports to hear (and to demonstrate by detailed analysis) a whole range of thematic cross-
connections and subtle inter-movement unifying features (Dunsby 1983; also Dunsby 1981). To 
which Street responcls that Dunsby's desire to 'discover' such features in the music is a projec-
tion of his own analytic (ancl ideologically-driven) belief that a great work must, by very defi-
nition, manifest them in some degree and that the greatness of these particular pieces can be 
brought out ali the more convincingly by showing their unity to transcend the limits of their 
surface, episodic or suite-like fonn (Street 1989). In the process Street draws upon a good many 
theoretical sources, among them de Man's deconstructive readings of numerous texts - philo-
sophical, literary, literary-critical - which he (de Man) takes to exhibit ali the signs of their hav-
ing been seduced by that form of aesthetic ideology which consists in 'confusing linguistic with 
natura! reality' (Man 1986: 11). Such is, for instance, the widespread idea among literary critics 
of otherwise diverse persuasion that poetic language somehow has the power not merely to 
describe, evoke, or represent features of the natura! world but (through devices like metaphor 
and symbol) to render them with ali the sensuous vividness that belongs to our various modes 
of perceptual experience. This elementary confusion - as de Man thinks it - gives rise to the 
further, more dangerous since icleologically charged error of attributing characteristics to lan-
guage which are then metaphorically extended beyond the aesthetic domain to concepts of lan-
guage, culture, and (ultimately) the nation-state as expressions of a likewise natura! process of 
organic development and growth. (See Man 1983, 1984, 1986.) 
Hence, to repeat, his constant emphasis on the need for close attention to those crucial pas-
sages in certain exemplary thinkers - pre-eminently Rousseau and Kant - which show how 
they managecl to avoid such temptations by maintaining the highest degree of critical vigilance, 
but also how their texts were la ter subject to various kincls of 'aberrant', ideologically driven 
misreading. It is this cleManian imperative that Street ancl other deconstructive musicologists 
have in mincl when they counsel an attitude of principled suspicion toward any method, tech-
nique, or practice of analysis that rests its claims on such illusory (and, in their view, political-
ly retrograde) notions as those of organic form or long-range structural unity. To which end 
they typically set about showing - as in Street's altercation with Dunsby - that the analyst's text 
itself contains certain symptomatic blind-spots or unnoticed and questionable turns of 
metaphor that unwittingly reveal its deep involvement with just such ideological values. Only 
thus, so the argument runs, can music criticism at last catch up with those developments in lit-
28 
C. NORRIS " IN DEFENCE OF 'STRUCTURAL HEARING': SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE ... 
era1y theory that have long since disposed of an organicist aesthetic, like that of the 'old' New 
Criticism, whose talk was of seemingly disruptive or 'non-totalising' figures such as ambiguity, 
irony, or paradox but whose overriding aim was to present the poem as a 'verbal icon' where-
in such tensions were finally resolved or reconciled. (See especially Brooks 1947 and Wimsatt 
1954.) Here again de Man is taken to provide an object-lesson in the deconstructive reading of 
texts that are thereby forced to reveal their ideological hand (Man 1983). 
To be sure, Street brings some strong theoretical arguments to bear on the discourse of 
mainstream music analysis, arguments which make a plausible case for viewing it as heavily 
moltgaged to just those values that de Man finds complicit with the workings of aesthetic ide-
ology. His proposed remedy - again taking a lead from de Man - is to read that discourse 
against the grain by refusing to endorse the privilege it attaches to tropes such as metaphor 
and symbol, that is to say, 'totalising' tropes which reliably facilitate the passage from particu-
lar details of the literary work to a conception of that work as exhibiting an overall, transcen-
dent unity of theme and idea (Man 1983: 187-208; also Man 1979). Such a reading would take 
as its principal aim the demonstration that metaphors self-deconstruct into chains of metonymic 
displacement, substitution, or surreptitious part-for-whole transference, and moreover that the 
symbolist notion of organic form - as it figures (expressly or implicitly) in so many versions of 
aesthetic ideology - can likewise be shown to fall back upon textual mechanisms whose struc-
ture is that of allegory, rather than symbol. This is not the place for a full-scale exposition of 
the various texts (in particular his readings of Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Proust) where these 
claims are tested to the utmost degree of hard-pressed rhetorical analysis, not to mention - as 
some might add - the utmost limits of readerly endurance. (Man 1979 and Kerman 1962; 
Kerman 1967; Kerman 1981; also Gasche 1998 and Norris 988.) Suffice it to say that metonymy 
stands as the trope whose prosaic, down-earth, literal, non-'totalising' character allows it most 
effectively to counter the claims of metaphor, that is, to remind us how the language of 
metaphor unravels or self-deconstructs into chains of contingently-related metonymic detail 
that stubbornly resist assimilation to the realm of metaphorical quasi-transcendence. So like-
wise in the case of allegory versus symbol: where symbolist readings typically indulge in an 
over-willingness to take such claims at face value (that is, as achieving a consummate union 
between subject and object, mind and nature, time-bound or mo!tal existence and a realm of 
transcendent eternal truths) allegorical readings typically insist on the temporal character of all 
understanding and hence the sheer impossibility that language might attain that wished-for 
condition. 
Thus allegory is not so much a well-defined literary genre - including such works as 1be 
Faerie Queene, Pilgrim 's Progress, or Animal Farm - but a celtain mode of critically reflective 
and rhetorically alert close-reading which holds out against the seductive blandishments of 
symbolist thought. And again: metonymy is not (as often supposed) just a kind of poor rela-
tion to metaphor, that is to say, a trope whose mundane character - forming as it does the 
stock-in-trade of most non-'litera1y', e.g„ joumalistic or workaday prose - invites unfavourable 
comparison with the creative or world-disclosive potential of metaphoric language. Rather, on 
de Man's account, it is a trope that can be shown to inhabit that language and indeed to con-
stitute the underlying structure of every (supposed) metaphor. Thus metonymy and allegory 
turn out to subvert the traditional order of priorities and the high claims vested in metaphor 
and symbol as somehow granting access to truths beyond the grasp of commonplace, prosaic 
understanding. So to read allegorically and with an eye to metonymic details that resist or 
obstruct the suasive power of other, more seductive metaphorical-symbolist readings is also to 
engage in a form of Ideologiekritik with large implications for our thinking about issues of 
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ethics and politics. This is why, as de Man provocatively puts it with an eye on his Marxist or 
cultural-materialist critics, "[t]hose who reproach literary theory for being oblivious to social and 
historical (that is to say ideological) reality are merely stating their fear at having their own ide-
ological mystifications exposed by the tool they are trying to discredit. They are, in short, very 
poor readers of Marx's German Ideolog:/ (Man 1986: 11). 
However there is a problem - I want to suggest - with attempts to transfer this approach 
from the realm of literary criticism to the domain of musical analysis where any claims 
advanced on behalf of this or that 'reading' must surely concede a certain priority to the per-
ceptual or phenomenological experience of music. That is to say, the fact that many verbal 
analyses (like Dunsby on the Brahms Fantasies) can be shown to exhibit a strong attachment 
to organicist models or metaphors is no proof that they are distorting or misrepresenting the 
music to ideological ends, or indeed that those metaphors don't capture something intrinsic to 
the well-equipped listener's pleasure and appreciation. Where de Man's arguments get a hold 
is through the undisputed truth - undisputed by ali save die-hard adherents to a Cratylist doc-
trine of linguistic mimeticism - that language is a system of purely conventional ('arbitrary') 
relations between signifiers and signifieds, or again (in Saussurean structuralist parlance) of 'dif-
ferences without positive terms' (Saussure 1974). Thus apart from such oddities as ono-
matopoeia or cases, as with poetry, where the sound very often in some way 'echoes the sense' 
it is a clearly a fallacy - and one subjected to withering critical scrutiny by de Man - to sup-
pose that verbal language can somehow partake of the 'natura!' reality that makes up its field 
of reference. In de Man's somewhat tortuous phrasing: '[t]he phenomenality of the signifier, as 
sound, is unquestionably involved in the correspondence between the name and the thing 
named, but the link, the relationship between word and thing, is not phenomenal, but con-
ventional' (Man 1986: 10). And again: '[l]iterature is fiction not because it somehow refuses to 
acknowledge "reality", but because it is not a priori certain that language functions according 
to principles which are those, or which are like those, of the phenomenal world' (Man 1986: 
11). However it is far from clear that this argument might plausibly be carried across from the 
textual-linguistic to the musical domain, or - what is chiefly at issue here - from deconstruc-
tive readings of the discourse of music analysis to claims concerning our perceptual or phe-
nomenological experience of music. For these latter have to do with modalities of jointly sen-
suous and cognitive (i.e„ conceptually informed) perception which cannot be treated as mere 
figments of 'aesthetic ideology', or as symptoms of the Cratylist delusion that naively conflates 
linguistic structures with the forms or processes pertaining to natura! phenomena. 
This is why, as I have said, theorists should not too hastily reject the idea of 'structural lis-
tening' - whether advanced by mainstream analysts or by a critical dialectician like Adorno -
as just a product of those old elitist values that serve to shore up both the canon of established 
'great works' and the business of academic musicology. For it is simply not the case - or, at 
least, not simply the case - that such listening (and the pleasure afforded by it) is confined to 
some few professional adepts and leisured cognoscenti who have access to the specialist 
books, journals, or high-brow broadcast media whereby these values are diffused, along with 
the kinds of analytical approach that bolster their cultural standing. Rather, what is revealed by 
a good, sharp-eared, intelligent, and (above ali) intuitively valid essay in musical analysis is 
what the listener is able to hear for herself through close and sustained attention to the music 
although perhaps, without having read that essay, unable to articulate in verbal form with such 
point and precision. This is not to deny - far from it - that analysis can bring out aspects of a 
work, from subtleties of detail to aspects of long-range structure, that the listener might well 
have missed up to now or been 'aware' of only in so vague or unfocused a way as scarcely to 
30 
C. NORRIS • IN DEFENCE OF 'STRUCTURAL HEARING': SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE ... 
count as conscious recognition. Ali the same, such analytically arrived-at insights will them-
selves scarcely count as such unless they chime with something in the listener's intuitive musi-
cal response which then serves as a measure of just how far the analyst has managed to hit on 
the right (i.e„ perceptually salient) aspects of detail and structure. 
A rough but useful analogy here would be that of the grammarian whose theories of what 
constitutes a well-formed or ill-formed sentence, a normal or deviant active-passive transfor-
mation, and so fo1th, must always be checked against the verdicts of a competent native speak-
er if they are to claim any kind of descriptive validity. Indeed, one branch of recent, post-
Schenkerian analysis that brings out this point very clearly is the transformational-generative 
model proposed by Lerdahl and Jackendorff, where listener-response must surely be a crucial 
test in evaluating some particular claim with regard to what's really going on the process of 
depth-to-surface tona! and thematic transformation (Lerdahl / Jackendoff 1983). Nevertheless, 
bere as with other kinds of analysis, one should also allow for the extent to which musical per-
ceptions can be further, more deeply or even creatively informed by the kinds of conscious-
ness-raising structural insight that such theories seek to provide. It is this possibility that seems 
to be barred - ruled out on ideological grounds - by those among the New Musicologists who 
see nothing but a rearguard defence of elitist cultural values in the value attached to 'structur-
al listening' as against the claims of straightfo1ward, uncomplicated musical pleasure. That is 
say, these theorists may be indulging a form of inverted cultural snobbery whereby it is 
assumed that complex, long-range or sophisticated modes of musical appreciation are ipso 
f acto beyond reach of a popular audience while other, more immediate forms of gratification 
- those pleasures to be had from 'music in the moment' - are the sort that do possess a wide-
spread appeal and should therefore be defended against their detractors by anyone with a well-
developed social and political conscience. However, this risks selling everyone short: the ana-
lysts (whose efforts are written off as mere products of aesthetic ideology), the 'structural lis-
teners' (who are, after ali, perfectly entitled to their own kinds of satisfaction), the creators and 
performers of 'popular' music (which itself covers a huge range in terms of musical complexi-
ty and value), and - not least - the mass-audience whom these theorists effectively rule off-
bounds when it comes to other, more demanding (and perhaps more musically rewarding) 
modes of listener-involvement. 
The phrase 'music in the moment', as used above, is actually the title of a book by Jerrold 
Levinson which raises some of these issues from a different but related philosophical angle 
(Levinson 1997). Levinson agrees with the New Musicologists that analysis goes wrong by 
attaching such inordinate value to long-range structural aspects of music, as distinct from those 
far more vivid, direct, and readily appreciated 'momentary' features - accessible to short-term 
memory - which constitute the listener's chief source of genuine (rather than abstract or hyper-
cultivated) pleasure. However his reasons for taking this view have less to do with any pro-
gramme of socio-cultural-political critique than with certain lessons which he thinks should be 
drawn from phenomenological or cognitive-psychological reflection on the scope and limits of 
perceptual responses to music. In brief, these are that our attention-span is more restricted than 
the analysts suppose, that our powers of retentive grasp are confined to just a short stretch of 
tirne, and moreover that even when we know a work well - and should thus (on the analytic 
view) have a long-term anticipatory awareness of developments yet to come - we are still lis-
tening very much 'in the moment' and largely oblivious of them unless at a leve! of abstraction 
far removed from the actual experience of music. Thus Levinson - like Subotnik but on dif-
ferent grounds - takes a pretty dim view of any analytic approach whose effect is to promote 
the virtues of structural listening and thereby devalue the pleasures that accrue (more predse-
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ly: that occur in rapid succession) if one lends an ear more attuned to those short-term modes 
of perceptual experience. 
He is challenged on this by another philosopher, Peter Kivy, who not only disagrees strong-
ly with Levinson conceming those tight limits on the human capacity for long-range musical 
perception but states his disagreement in unusually forceful and passionate terms (Kivy 2001). 
For Kivy - and also, I should say, for myself as a matter of personal as well as theoretical con-
viction - it is a truth borne out on many occasions over the years that one's appreciation of 
music can be greatly enhanced by the reading of perceptive analyses which conduce to a 
heightened, more adequate grasp of large-scale structural attributes far beyond the sadly 
impoverished range of Levinson's amnesiac listener. Indeed, I would suggest that Levinson's 
low estimation of our normal capacities in this respect is such as to imply a likewise low esti-
mation of the standards that music should meet - standards of inventiveness, thematic interest, 
sustained harmonic development, tona! progression, rhythmic subtlety, and so forth - if it is to 
offer the kinds of reward that come with repeated and properly attentive listening. Thus any-
one whose powers of retentive or anticipatory awareness were really as limited as Levinson 
decrees would be very much at home with the compositions of Philip Glass, Michael Nyman, 
(the later) Arvo Part, John Tavener, and other such exponents of a minimalist style which relies 
on the constant repetition of bana! and easily recognised themes with just enough in the way 
of undemanding harmonic or rhythmic variation to jog the hearer into semi-consciousness once 
in a while. Or again, they would be equipped to appreciate a large amount of bottom-drawer 
baroque music which also involves an absolute minimum of 'structural listening' in so far as it 
rehearses a predictable range of well-wom stylistic and forma! techniques with only minor 
departures from the expectations raised by an acquaintance with the relevant generic norms. 
However their responses would fall drastically short when it came (say) to Bach, to Vivaldi's 
more inventive works, to those other baroque composers (or individual works) that rose above 
the stock-in-trade conventions of the tirne, or to all but the earliest of Haydn's quartets and 
symphonies. Stili less could they come close to a real appreciation - as distinct from a piece-
meal enjoyment - of mature Mozart, late Beethoven, Schubert, Brahms, or indeed any music 
where the interplay set up between expectations and the thwarting or subtle disrupting of those 
same expectations is a chief source of senso1y-perceptual pleasure and intellectual stimulus 
alike. 
4 
Hence, as I have said, the taint of inverted snobbe1y that hangs around the discourse of 
professional musicologists, theorists, and philosophers who claim to be speaking on behalf of 
the common listener when they attack such 'elitist' values, but whose argument can just as 
plausibly be read as an attack on the overweening pretensions of any listener - 'common' or 
not - with a taste for more developed or sophisticated modes of musical response. This revolt 
against analysis (or structural listening) in the name of, ostensibly, more direct and non-exclu-
sive musical pleasures is one that has other dubious results. They include the retum - by var-
ious exponents of the 'New Musicology' - to an oddly reductive and literalist notion of pro-
grammatic content (often reminiscent of the old 'life-and-times' approach) motivated partly by 
their anti-formalist bias and partly by the concomitant desire to bring music and music criticism 
back down to earth through an account of their class-based, gender-inflected, or ideologically 
'constructed' character. 
Here again Kivy has some sharp observations to make, especially conceming this current 
trend in its cruder, more doctrinaire manifestations. Thus there is, to say the least, something 
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caricatural about hearing the pent-up dynamism in the first-movement development section of 
Beethoven's Eroica Symphony as an expression (or unwittingly blatant confession) of the 
thwarted rapist's urgent drive for sexual maste1y (McC!ary 1991; also McC!ary 2000). Nor does 
it conduce very much to our better musical understanding to be told that the contrast between 
'masculine' first subject and 'feminine' second subject in the opening movement of 
Tchaikovski's Fifth represents a desperate struggle in the composer's mind between socially-
enforced denial and deeply-felt acceptance of his own homosexual desires (McC!ary 1991). 
Admittedly these are extreme cases and one could instance other readings of musical works 
with a view to their (often ambivalent) psychosexual or ideological sub-text which involve 
nothing like so crassly reductive an approach. Nevertheless, even at its most sensitive and 
methodologically refined, this approach tends push the anti-formalist reaction to a point where 
it risks falling back into a harmful confusion of life and work. That is to say, it shows many 
signs of regressing to a standpoint strangely unconversant with Adomo's far subtler, more musi-
cally responsive yet also - quite compatible with this - more historically and socio-politically 
informed mode of analytic discourse. Thus when theorists like Subotnik claim to have thought 
their way through and beyond Adomo's influence - and to have done so, moreover, by an out-
right rejection of ideas such as that of 'structural listening' - one is entitled to question whether 
this constitutes any kind of intellectual advance or indeed (as advertised) a retum to the val-
ues of genuine musical enjoyment as opposed to the abstract rigours of forma! analysis. 
Kivy makes the point rather neatly when he invites us to entertain a thought-experiment 
regarding the claims of programmatic or 'content'-based interpretation on the one hand and 
formalist or structurally-oriented approaches on the other (Kivy 2001). Consider, he suggests, 
the case of three accomplished but in varying degrees untypical appreciators of the arts - Peter, 
Paul and Mary - whose aesthetic responses each have a certain distinctive or peculiar feature. 
Peter is an enthusiast for German poetry who possesses an exceptionally acute ear for the pho-
netic qualities (rhyme-schemes, pattems of alliteration, or ways of playing off of metrical struc-
ture against natura! speech-rhythms) to be found in Goethe, Holderlin, and Rilke but who does-
n't understand a word of German and thus savours those qualities with not the least grasp of 
how the sound echoes or subtly qualifies the sense. Paul is a visual-art connoisseur who has 
developed an ultra-fine appreciation of various forma! attributes - of balance, contrast, struc-
tural proportion, perspedival effects, the interplay of light and shade, etc. - but who suffers 
from a curious kind of aspect-blindness that prevents him from perceiving the representation-
al content of figurative paintings. Then there is Mary, a music-lover, who doesn't merely 'know' 
(in the abstract) all that abstract stuff about sonata-form, first and second subjects, developing 
variation, progressive tonality, and so forth but who truly understands, enjoys, and appreciates 
what music has to offer on just those descriptive or analytical terms. That is to say, she is a 'for-
malist' or adept of 'structural listening' but one to whom this comes very much as second nature 
and for whom such descriptions genuinely chime with her first-hand, intuitive and passionate-
ly engaged experience of music. What puts her in the company of Peter and Paul, for the pur-
poses of Kivy's thought-experiment, is that Mary just doesn't get it when people talk about the 
programmatic content of works like the Eroica Symphony, or Haydn's Creation, or Richard 
Strauss's Bin Heldenleben, or Elgar's Falstaff, or indeed - perhaps more controversially - some 
of Bach's (to most ears) very striking mimetic devices in his settings of religious texts. (These 
are my examples, not Kivy's.) Thus Mary might be counted a fellow-sufferer in so far as she 
seems to be missing out on something that other, 'normally' equipped listeners can be expect-
ed to hear in the music and which presumably heightens their appreciative grasp of its con-
tent, meaning, and value. 
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However it is just Kivy's point that, despite appearances, these cases are in fact very dif-
ferent. Thus whereas Peter can scarcely be said to 'appreciate' German poetry at ali, and where-
as Paul must likewise be considered blind to something intrinsic to the nature of figurative art, 
Mary cannot rightly be said to Jack anything essential to the proper understanding or appre-
ciative grasp of music. Perhaps it may be said - by anti-formalists of various persuasion - that 
she does in fact miss out on certain kinds of pleasure enjoyed by other listeners, i.e., those 
receptive or responsive to such elements of programmatic content. However, so Kivy main-
tains, this is surely not a failure of musical intelligence, perception, or involvement on her part, 
nor a deafness to anything intrinsically 'there' in the work, but rather a non-dependence on 
ways of listening that by very definition have at most an extraneous, secondary, or strictly 
inessential role to play. More than that: in cases where the listener - or (possibly) the music -
does rely heavily on attributions of programmatic content then this gives reason to suppose 
that one or other falls short of what the best, that is to say, most musically rewarding since least 
secondary-response-dependent works have to offer. 
Now of course this will strike the opponent (whether old-style defender of content-based 
musical interpretation or new-style advocate of deconstructive, Foucauldian, feminist, neo-
Marxist or kindred forms of Jdeologiekritik) as just another, albeit neatly-turned statement of the 
formalist case and hence as subject to the same charges of inherent circularity or empty self-
confirmation. Indeed, it will no doubt stand accused of reinforcing that potent strain of 'aes-
thetic ideology' - transposed into the likewise highly suspect notion of 'structural listening' -
which music theorists have been quick to take up from de Man's later writings. Ali the same, 
as I have said, such accusations run the risk of ignoring some pertinent Ceven some ideologi-
cally crucial) distinctions, among them that between the kinds of deeply organicist, method-
ologically doctrinaire, and often quite explicitly chauvinist formalism exemplified by Schenker 
and those other varieties of analysis - whatever their particular problems or shortcomings - that 
hardly conform to this stereotype. Thus Adorno's work provides one striking example of an 
expressly analytic approach (and a corresponding emphasis on the virtues of structural aware-
ness) conjoined with a range of cultural, historical, and - not least - philosophical reflections 
on the complex dialectical relationship between music and its social contexts of production and 
reception. (See Adorno 1973, 1982, 1991, 1991a, 1991b, 1997, 1998, 1998a.) But there are, and 
for quite a while have been, plenty of other, less elaborately theorised instances of music crit-
icism that manages to heal - or at any rate to bridge for its own specific purposes - the rift that 
Kerman lamented between the discourse of music analysis and those wider contexts. Here I 
am thinking especially of Charles Rosen's writings, where a singular depth and acuity of musi-
cal perception goes along with a detailed scholarly knowledge of the relevant socio-cultural 
background and also a keenly intelligent sense of how debates in other areas (historiography, 
narrative theory, poetics, hermeneutics, and so forth) may help toward a better, more appre-
ciative understanding. (See for instance Rosen 1975, 1976, 1996, 2000.) I would also mention -
among my own favourites - the wonderfully perceptive study of Ravel by Vladimir 
Jankelevitch, a critic whose other chief interests (in phenomenology, ethics, the philosophy of 
tirne, and irony) can be seen to inform his responses to the music in numerous subtle and 
revealing ways (Jankelevitch 1951, 1959). 
So I am inclined to disagree with Kerman as regards his 1982 diagnosis and to suggest that 
things were in fact nowhere near as bad with the then-current state of academic musicology as 
he made out. Moreover, as implied by the above comparisons, it strikes me that Rosen is jus-
tified in claiming that a good deal of work produced by its subsequent, theory-led and socio-
logically-minded debunkers must be found to fall far short of the insights delivered by intelli-
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gent, context-sensitive analysis (Rosen 1994). That isto say, there is something distinctly wrong-
headed about the notion that these approaches cannot go together, that a penchant for analy-
sis must entail an attitude of downright indifference to socio-historical concerns and hence a 
complicity with dominant ideological values, or again - conversely - that a critical engagement 
with those same concerns and values will inevitably lead one to reject 'analysis' and all its 
works. On the contrary, I have argued: not only can and do they sometimes go very nicely 
together but it is also the case that neither approach can come close to an adequate under-
standing of music without those insights and conceptual resources provided by the other. This 
is one issue where literary theory might offer a useful lead, not so much in its more extreme 
(e.g„ purist deconstructive or cultural-materialist) strains but more through its effort, over the 
past few decades, to achieve a synthesis or working balance between the formalist/structural-
ist imperative to analyse texts in strictly synchronic terms and the kinds of diachronic, histori-
cally-based approach enjoined by Marxists, sociologists of literature, and others of a seeming-
ly opposite persuasion. (See especially Lodge 1977.) Thus, as Roland Barthes once wrote in a 
cryptic but typically pregnant passage, 'while a little formalism turns one away from history, a 
lot of formalism turns one back to it' (Barthes 1984: 186). At any rate there is more to be gained 
in this way, from the viewpoint of a critical musicology, than by following other doctrinally 
committed literary theorists to the point of an ultimate stand-off or breakdown of communica-
tion between the interests of analysis or 'structural listening' and the interests of historically-
informed commentary. 
The same applies - so I have argued - to that other false antinomy between music as an 
object of analysis and music as a source of pleasure. What we need to do here is triangulate 
and see that there is pleasure to be taken not only in the process or activity of formal/struc-
tural understanding but also in the kinds of appreciative benefit brought by a knowledge of 
music in its cultural-historical context. This might seem at odds with my general endorsement 
of Kivy's case as regards the primacy of forma! attributes - and our ability to perceive or appre-
hend them - over any such merely 'extraneous' concerns. However one can take his argument 
on board (i.e„ the primacy-thesis as a matter of aesthetic principle) without concluding that 
those latter sorts of knowledge or interest are therefore to be counted strictly irrelevant to musi-
cal experience, properly so called. There is support for this more accommodating version of 
the thesis from a range of disciplinary quarters, among them that of cognitive psychology 
where recent debate has often turned on the extent to which our various mental capacities 
should be thought of as 'encapsulated' or 'hard-wired'. That is to say, it is the issue as to just 
how far - if at all - they involve the operation of relatively discrete, self-contained, or (in the 
jargon) 'cognitively impervious' modules which carry out their multiple specialised functions 
with little or no input from other, more globa! or widely distributed modes of cognitive pro-
cessing. 
Jerry Podor is the best-known defender of the 'strong'-modularity thesis according to which 
this applies to quite a range of otherwise diverse mental functions (Podor 1976, 1983, 1989). 
These would include our everyday syntactic competence as language-users (here taking a lead 
from Chomsky's work in transformational-generative grammar) and also types of behaviour -
like the 'fight-or-flight' response - which may well have required a complex but rapid and 
unthinking, i.e„ highly 'encapsulated' cognitive mechanism so as to facilitate species survival. 
However Podor has lately shown signs of softening that line, at least in so far as he now sees 
intractable problems with the strong thesis when it comes to offering some plausible account 
of how we manage to perform high-level, complex, and inherently hard-to-formalise mental 
tasks - such as abduction, or inference to the best explanation - which must involve drawing 
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on a wide range of background knowledge, much of it tacit or below the threshold of con-
scious awareness (Fodor 2000). This also has a bearing on our thought about music, as Mark 
DeBellis has argued in a recent book on cognitive-psychological aspects of the dispute 
between formalism (or 'structural listening') and its various detractors (DeBellis 1995). Tn brief, 
he puts the case that our musical responses cannot be strongly modular since they are clearly 
affected - most often in positive or experience-enhancing ways - not only by our reading of 
perceptive musical analyses but also, if to less striking effect, by our knowledge of relevant his-
torical and socio-cultural background information. That such knowledge indeed belongs to the 
background, rather than the foreground where analysis has a more significant role to play, is 
a main plank in DeBellis's argument for the conceptually-informed nature of musical under-
standing and hence - in cognitive-psychological terms - its 'permeability' by the kinds of 
knowledge conveyed by sharp-eared analysts or structural listeners. Ali the same, it is hard to 
see how a principled distinction could be drawn so as to hold the formalist line between one 
and the other sorts of musical consciousness-raising, i.e., that which results from acquaintance 
with 'genuine' analytic insights and that which contingently accrues through exposure to some 
more-or-less 'relevant' piece of musico-historical information. 
Thus DeBellis, like Kivy, makes a strong case for the merits of analysis as an active, inte-
gral, even transformative component of our musical experience rather than - as the current 
debunkers would have it - a discourse whose deeply ideological character is signalled by its 
sheer remoteness from such experience as well as its commitment to suspect values like those 
of thematic development, structural coherence, or (worst of all!) organic form. On the other 
hand their arguments also leave room for the intuitive conviction of many listeners, not ali of 
them by any means na!ve or musically illiterate, that knowledge of a work's historical context 
and even of certain psycho-biographical factors can often have a more-than-anecdotal bearing 
on the listener's musical experience. This it may well be true - as DeBellis maintains - that 
such experience, though grounded to some extent in a 'modular' capacity of musical response, 
nevertheless draws widely on other cognitive resources including that of analytically informed 
structural listening. But then there seems no compelling reason (formalist prejudice apart) to 
reject the idea that information of other sorts might play a broadly comparable role, albeit sub-
ject to the twin condition of (1) its demonstrable relevance to the work or passage in hand, 
and (2) the possibility of bringing out that relevance through an adequately detailed musical 
analysis in some shape or form. The chief problem with recent debate is that it has managed 
to create this artificially induced dilemma between a typecast 'formalism' wholly bereft of sub-
stantive historical or socio-cultural content and a likewise typecast 'reductionist' approach in 
the latter vein. Moreover, both have tended - through a kind of Newtonian equal-and-oppo-
site-reaction principle - to adopt increasingly doctrinaire stances on the main points at issue 
and thereby confirm their opponents' worst suspicions. 
5 
If deconstructive musicologists want to break out of this dead-end predicament then they 
might take a second (or maybe a first) look at Derrida's essay 'Parergon', where he reflects with 
extraordinary tact, subtlety, and insight on the problems raised by Kant's formalist aesthetic 
(Derrida 1987: 15-147). What emerges from Derrida's reading of the Third Critique is a series 
of deep-laid aporias - conflicts, dilemmas, moments of strictly unresolvable impasse - having 
to do with the Kantian insistence on forma! autonomy as an absolute requirement of art and 
aesthetic disinterest as the absolute condition for appreciating art (or natura! beauty) as a mat-
ter of purely contemplative, i.e., non-instrumental pleasure (Kant 1978). Thus Kant is constantly 
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obliged, by the logic of his own argument, to posit a range of de jure distinctions - as between 
form and content, 'free' and 'adherent' beauty, intrinsic and extrinsic attributes, 'determinate' 
and 'indeterminate' modes of judgement - which can be shown to self-deconstruct through the 
impossibility of holding them firmly in place. That is to say, the entire conceptual structure of 
this work - along with its crucial justificatory role vis-a-vis certain epistemological and ethical 
issues that were left unresolved in the previous two Critiques - turns out to depend upon the 
use of arguments, examples, metaphors, and analogies that are strictly indispensable to Kant's 
case yet which complicate the logic of that case beyond its power fully to determine or con-
trol. 
Such is what Derrida describes as the 'parergonal' character of Kant's reasoning (from the 
Greek 'parergon' = 'frame', 'border', or 'that which surrounds, encloses, or sets off a work whilst 
not an integral part of it'). 'Parergonality' thus takes its place as another in the sequence of 
deviant, non-classical, or paraconsistent logics that Derrida first broached in his readings of 
'supplementarity' in Rousseau, the pharmakon in Plato, dijferance in Husserl, and 'iterability' 
in the discourse of Austinian speech-act theory. (See Derrida 1987, 1976, 1980, 1982, 1989; also 
Norris 2003.) With Kant it emerges in some obvious ways, as for instance in his strange, sure-
ly untenable case for excluding from aesthetic consideration (i.e., from the domain of artistic 
form, properly so called) such 'parergonal' features as the drapery on statues, the colonnades 
of palaces, the flying buttresses or other 'merely' functional outworks that support gothic cathe-
drals, and so forth. However it also causes problems for his cardinal distinction between the 
realms of determinate and indeterminate judgement, or of knowledge (where sensuous intu-
itions are somehow 'brought under' adequate concepts) and aesthetic experience (where such 
concepts cannot apply since there would then be no room for that free and harmonious inter-
play of the faculties which signifies our appreciation of the beautiful). What these difficulties 
ali come down to is the fact that any such Kantian attempt to 'frame' or delimit the proper 
sphere of aesthetic judgement will always nm up against problems, aporias, or counter-
instances that make it strictly impossible to decide whether some feature should be counted 
'intrinsic' or 'extrinsic' to the artwork or our experience of it. 
Thus - to take the most obvious and literal case - the frame around a painting would seem 
parergonal by very definition, yet can scarcely be held to have no effect on our appreciation of 
the work, since the right choice of frame sets it off to best advantage while the wrong choice 
may detract from its aesthetic appeal. And things become more complicated stili if one consid-
ers how far - or by what kind of a priori aesthetic jurisdiction - the frame can serve as an imper-
meable border between that which properly belongs inside it (i.e., the painting) and that which 
exists altogether outside its aesthetically privileged space, such as the wall on which it is hung, 
the other paintings that surround it, or any number of supposedly irrelevant 'background' fac-
tors. For bere again it is only in deference to certain Kantian formalist distinctions - like those 
between intrinsic and extrinsic attributes, or 'free' and 'adherent' beauty - that we might feel 
impelled to maintain what is otherwise (as Derrida's reading brings out) a deeply problematical 
doctrine. Moreover, this difficulty goes yet deeper since it affects Kant's argument conceming 
the uniquely contemplative, disinterested, non-instrumental (and hence non-conceptual) char-
acter of aesthetic experience. For if this were indeed the case - if concepts (e.g., philosophical 
concepts) were wholly eA1:rinsic to our appreciation of art - then that experience could in no 
way be influenced, for better or worse, by our acquaintance with Kant's Third Critique or any 
other work of criticism, theory, analysis, or aesthetic philosophy. One only has to state the issue 
in these terms in order to see how implausible is that position and how pointedly Derrida's read-
ing engages with the aporias not only of Kantian aesthetics but of Kant's entire critical project. 
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Still it would be wrong - a gross misreading of Derrida's essay - to conclude that this puts 
him firmly on the side of those (at present a large company of sociologists, cultural theorists, 
postmodemists, and adepts of the New Musicology) who reject not only such formalist ideas 
as aesthetic autonomy or intrinsic value but also the entire discourse of post-Kantian aesthet-
ics as merely the expression of a dominant bourgeois ideology passing itself off as the pure, 
disinterested judgement of taste. (Bourdieu 1984; See especially Bourdieu; also - for some argu-
ments to contrary effect - Norris 2000.) For this is to ignore his repeated point: that such val-
ues are deeply intertwined with the wider, i.e„ the ethical and socio-political project of enlight-
ened thought, and hence cannot (or should not) be renounced whatever the abuses to which 
they have subject and the various ideological admixtures or impurities that have always gone 
along with them. (In this connection, see Derrida 1983, 1992, 1992a; also Norris 2000 and Norris 
1993.) Thus Derrida expressly repudiates the kinds of wholesale anti-enlightenment thinking 
associated chiefly with postmodernist thinkers like Lyotard, and also - on related grounds - the 
sorts of dismissive or downright contemptuous attitude toward any talk of disinterest, aesthet-
ic value, the sensus communis of shared critical judgement, and so forth, adopted by the cur-
rent debunking school of thought (Lyotard 1984). To be sure, he devotes much of his argu-
ment in 'Parergon' and other middle-period writings to a detailed analysis of the way that those 
cardinal Kantian distinctions - all of which tum on some variant of the pure/impure dichoto-
my - can be shown to break down, under deconstructive pressure, into further such value-
laden binaries (like 'free' versus 'adherent' beauty) that are no more capable of holding up 
when subject to critical reading. All the same, as I have said, Derrida is very firm in maintain-
ing the 'absolute and principled' necessity that those aims, values and priorities should be kept 
constantly in view as the only means by which thinking can orient itself toward a better under-
standing of the various factors and forces that work against their attainment as a matter of eth-
ical or socio-political justice. 
This is why philosophy takes its place on the 'left bench' of the Kantian parliament of the 
faculties, that is to say, as a discipline utterly remote from the centres of executive or legisla-
tive power. Y et it is a faculty which, for that very reason, should be granted the freedom to 
question and criticise any uses or abuses of such power, or indeed any item of received belief 
- political, moral, or theological - that might be enjoined upon those right-bench occupants 
whose executive status allows them no equivalent freedom. (See Kant 1979 and Kant 1976.) 
This is also why the discourse of aesthetic judgement, concemed as it is (on the Kantian 
account) with matters at the furthest possible remove from the interests of govemment and 
state, should none the less be seen - and again, for just that reason - as embodying certain, 
albeit as yet unrealised and perhaps unrealisable values which offer a constant implicit critique 
of the executive branch. So it can hardly be denied that Derrida's reading goes various elabo-
rate ways around in order to question or to deconstruct the concepts, categories, and presup-
positions of Kantian formalist aesthetics. However - and it is here that the New Musicologists 
have most to leam - it does so always in such a way as to conserve their critical valence and 
thereby maintain the critical tension between this way of thinking (or the kinds of experience 
envisaged by its advocates) and the conditions under which it must presently remain a dis-
course marked by various kinds of contaminating ideological influence. Given tirne, one could 
trace this nexus of themes right back to some of Derrida earliest essays where they are engaged 
by way of the conflict of interpretations between, on the one hand, a structuralist approach that 
treats the literary text as an autonomous, self-referential, ahistorical entity and, on the other, a 
phenomenological approach that treats it as expressing - inevitably so - a wide range of socio-
cultural as well as individual or subjective meanings. (See especially Derrida 1978.) Here again 
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he adopts not a blandly accommodating line that would simply defuse the issue but, in the 
strictest sense, a deconstructive mode of engagement that locates the predse points of tension, 
aporias, or methodological blind-spots on both sides so as to achieve a more adequate grasp 
of the interests and commitments at stake. 
My point in ali this is that the New Musicologists - or some of them - have been too quick 
to claim Derridean warrant for certain of their claims with regard to the bankrupt, ideological-
ly complicitous character of music analysis in general and (more specifically) formalist notions 
of structural listening or long-range thematic and tona! integration. What is being played out in 
these somewhat predictable debates - like that between Dunsby and Street - is yet another ver-
sion of the well-worn 'analytic' versus 'continental' spat in recent (mainly Anglophone) phi-
losophy. Thus analytical types charge the continentals with indulging deplorably lax standards 
of conceptual clarity and grasp while the latter see nothing in that rival discourse but a narrow-
minded professionalism which treats ali philosophy as aspiring to the strictly self-evident 
(hence tautological or vacuous) status of the analytic proposition. (For further discussion, see 
Norris 2000a.) If there is one area of study where such pseudo-dilemmas should have no place 
it is that of music criticism, taken (one would hope uncontroversially) to embrace whatever 
kinds of approach can be shown to enhance our understanding of and pleasure in the experi-
ence of music. No doubt there are some theorists who will indeed controvert the na"ive or 
hopefully ecumenical assumption underlying that last sentence. That is, they will take issue 
with the joint claim that better, more refined or structurally informed understanding is itself a 
great source of musical pleasure, and again, that such pleasure is by no means just an unwit-
ting product of 'aesthetic ideology' or a mere distraction from the sorts of hard-headed 
Jdeologiekritik that would expose its less-than-edifying cultural and socio-political origins. 
Amongst them, as I have said, are certain deconstructive musicologists who cast a cold eye on 
the very idea - the 'eudaimonic' delusion, in de Man's parlance - that pleasure might have any 
significant role to play in an undeceived, rigorous, critically alert response to those works (or 
to the discourse about them) that solicit our enjoyment on terms unacceptable by any such 
exacting standard (Man 1986). 
Ali the more ironic, therefore, that these theorists should also have taken to denouncing 
formal-structural 'analysis' as an adjunct to the strain of aesthetic ideology which supposedly 
promotes this complicity with suspect modes of musical experience. After ali, until quite recent-
ly - in fact, around the tirne of Kerman' s landmark intervention - the main dispute within music 
criticism was that between 'appreciative' and 'analytic' schools of thought, a dispute going back 
(as I mentioned at the start of this essay) to the early days of textual close-reading as a liter-
ary-critical method. So it is strange, and a symptom of the currently widespread 'hermeneutics 
of suspicion', that we should now have a sizeable number of music theorists - something like 
a new orthodoxy - for whom both approaches must be treated with the utmost caution (or 
even rejected tout court) since they each bear witness to the powerful hold of an aesthetic 
creed that exerts, in de Man's admonitory phrase, a decisive claim on the 'shape and limits of 
our freedom'. (See especially Man 1984a.) It seems to me, for reasons argued above, that one 
unfortunate result of such over-zealous transpositions from one domain (literary theo1y) to 
another (music criticism) is to dictate the shape and limits of our musical experience in a way 
that excludes - or at any rate sternly disapproves - just about everything which gives that expe-
rience its ultimate meaning and value. 
This is not to deny - far from it - that theory, including those particular strains that I have 
criticised here, has a proper and legitimate place in musicological discourse. So it does, to be 
sure, in ali areas or disciplines of thought where a refusal to theorise most often betokens either 
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sheer intellectual laziness or (as the deconstructors would claim) an unthinking adherence to 
received ideologies whose own theoretical content is passed off as straightforward, natura], or 
common-sense wisdom. Besides, it follows from my brief excursion into the field of cognitive 
psychology that our experience of music can often be affected - significantly changed or 
enhanced - not only by the reading of perceptive music analyses but also by acquaintance with 
certain theoretical ideas, among them (quite possibly) those advanced by deconstructive musi-
cologists. (On this topic more generally, see Aiello / Sloboda 1993; Deutsch 1999; Dowling / 
Harwood 1986; Sloboda 1985.) Thus, for instance, our understanding/appreciation of 
Beethoven's late quartets (or the Brahms piano pieces discussed by Alan Street) might well 
stand to gain through our taking account of those features that hold out against any overly 
'organicist' interpretation. Indeed, this idea that musical value may have to do precisely with 
the conflict or tension between background norms of structural unity and other, more disrup-
tive foreground elements is one that finds favour even with critics, like Leonard Meyer, who 
are often pilloried by the New Musicologists as slavish adherents to the old formalist paradigm. 
(See for instance Meyer 1965.) Yet it is hard to see how such an argument could work, or such 
values apply, were it not for those same normative expectations - of structural development, 
thematic contrast, tona] progression, and so forth - which constitute a point of reference and 
departure for whatever strikes the well-attuned listener as marking a break with established 
modes of compositional practice. 
Still less could it work on the curious premise - one shared, be it noted, not only by de 
Man but also by a high formalist like Kant - that any taint of sensuous experience in our think-
ing about issues of aesthetic worth or (in the present context) of musical structure and mean-
ing must betoken, as Kant puritanically puts it, a 'pathological' admixture of motives or desires 
at odds with the purely disinterested character of true aesthetic evaluation (Kant 1978). While 
the New Musicologists are pretty much united in rejecting Kant's claims for aesthetic disinter-
est, forma] autonomy, 'pure' as opposed to 'impure' modes of judgement, and so forth, they 
are oddly in accord when it comes to his deep mistrust of that whole dimension of aesthetic 
experience where the pleasures of sensuous apprehension are closely bound up with those of 
cognitive understanding and structural grasp. What this gives us, in effect, is the worst of both 
worlds: an approach whose foregone theoretical commitments enjoin us to renounce (or at any 
rate to treat with the greatest suspicion) not only the sensuous experience of music but also 
the heightened pleasure and appreciation that comes of an informed musical understanding. I 
have suggested that such thinking takes rise from a number of erroneous premises, chief 
among them the idea that structural analysis must always entail the subscription to some kind 
of doctrinaire organicist creed, thus revealing the grip of an aesthetic ideology that nalvely con-
flates the realm of linguistic signification with the realm of natura! processes or forms. However 
this idea is itself the result of a drastic and unwarranted conflation. That is to say, it extrapo-
lates directly from the domain of literary theory - which of course has to do with linguistic texts 
and where the argument thus has a certain force against the more nalve and perhaps ideolog-
ically-loaded sorts of naturalistk fallacy - to the domain of music criticism where altogether dif-
ferent considerations apply. 
Along with this goes the claim - with its primary source, again, in de Man's writings - that 
any appeal to the sensory-perceptual experience of music is likewise suspect by reason of that 
same delus01y grounding in those natura! phenomena (e.g., the tona] system or overtone-
series) that constitute the essence of musical meaning and value. To be sure, such notions if 
pushed to an extreme have shown themselves amenable to ideological uses, as for instance in 
Schenker's chauvinist application of them and in kindred claims for the hegemonic status of 
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the 'mainstream', 'classical', i.e., Austro-German musical tradition. They are also quite explicit 
- ironically enough, given his life-history and fervent opposition to any such creed when 
deployed to overtly nationalist ends - in Schoenberg's idea of the dodecaphonic system as 
ensuring the continued pre-eminence of that same tradition through its progressive exploration 
of harmonic resources that didn't so much break altogether with tonality as move further out 
along the overtone series or circle of fifths (Schoenberg 1984 and Schoenberg 1995). However 
it is absurd to suppose that there always must be some deep-laid ideological bias at work 
whenever critics, analysts, or musically-informed listeners betray some adherence to the notion 
of music as gaining much of its expressive power through the affinity that exists between cer-
tain tona! or harmonic structures and certain modes of listener-response. Still less can it be war-
ranted to take this as grounds for rejecting the idea that analysis might play a useful, pleasure-
enhancing, even (at times) transformative role in making the process more readily available to 
conscious, reflective understanding. 
Empson got it right, I suggest, when he remarked in Seven Types oj Ambiguity that poetic 
'appreciation' has nothing to fear from exposure to verbal analysis since good poetry can only 
benefit from intelligent and perceptive close reading while the pleasures it affords are suffi-
ciently robust to withstand other, less sensitive or tactful approaches (Empson 1930). The same 
is true of musical analysis and moreover - be it said - of music theory just so long as it does-
n't invent a whole range of counter-intuitive and misconceived grounds for rejecting what 
analysis can fairly claim to offer, not only as a matter of forma! demonstration but also in terms 
of heightened appreciative yield. After ali, as Empson puts it, 'normal sensibility is a tissue of 
what has been conscious theory made habitual and returned to the pre-conscious, and, there-
fore, conscious theory may make an addition to sensibility' (Empson 1930: 254). And again: 'the 
act of knowing is itself an act of sympathising; unless you are enjoying the poetry you cannot 
create it, as poetry, in your mind' (Empson 1930: 253). It seems to me that these claims are 
strongly borne out by a good deal of recent work in cognitive psychology as well as by the 
way that a critic like Rosen - one with a wide range of philosophic as well as literary, cultur-
al-historical, and of course music-analytical interests - can provide such a depth of musical 
insight as to render any charge of 'aesthetic ideology' (in his case at least) just a tedious irrel-
evance. Where theory works to best, most telling effect is not so much by advancing whole-
sale diagnoses in the deconstructionist mode but rather by promoting a more reflective aware-
ness of how music relates to the various discourses - those of analysis and historiography 
among them - which undoubtedly inform our perceptual responses yet not to the point of 
though-and-through ideological conditioning envisaged by some current thinkers. 
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